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CRIMINAL LAW-JUDICIAL RESENTENCING OF OFFENDERS AF­
TER SERVICE HAS COMMENcED-State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797 
(Maine 1982). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1975, the criminal code of Maine was rewritten in an effort to 
update and reclassify its provisions.' As part of this revision, parole 
was abolished2 and section 1255 of Title 17-A of the Maine Revised 
Statutes Annotated was enacted as an alternative means of reviewing 
sentences.3 Under this statute, all sentences exceeding one year were 
1. See generally ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, Introduction to the Proposed Code 
(1983). 
2. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, §§ 1671-1679 (1964) (repealed by Act of June 16, 
1975, ch. 499, § 71, 1975 Me. Laws 1273, 1370). 
3. Act of June 6, 1975, ch. 499, § I, 1975 Me. Laws 1273, 1352 (current version at 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1255 (1983). 
This statute was originally enacted as section 1154. Id. (repealed and re-enacted as 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1255 (1983». Section 1255 is identical to the former 
section 1154. It reads: 
I. When a person has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term in ex­
cess of one year and such imprisonment has not been suspended, the sentence is 
deemed tentative, to the extent provided in this section. 
2. If, as a result of the department's evaluation of such person's progress 
toward a noncriminal way of life, the department is satisfied that the sentence 
of the court may have been based upon a misapprehension as to the history, 
character or physical or mental condition of the offender, or as to the amount of 
time that would be necessary to provide for protection of the public from such 
offender, the department may file in the sentencing court a petition to resen­
tence the offender. The petition shall set forth the information as to the of­
fender that is deemed to warrant his resentence and shall include a 
recommendation as to the sentence that should be imposed. 
3. The court may, in its discretion, dismiss a petition filed under subsec­
tion 2 without a hearing if it deems the information set forth insufficient to 
warrant reconsideration of the sentence. If the court finds the petition warrants 
such reconsideration, it shall cause a copy of the petition to be served on the 
offender, the district attorney, the Attorney General and the victim of the crime 
or, in the case of a criminal homicide, on the victim's next of kin, all of whom 
shall have the right to be heard on the issue. 
4. If the court grants a petition filed under subsection 2, it shall resen­
tence the offender and may impose any sentence not exceeding the original sen­
tence that was imposed. The period of his being in the custody of the 
department prior to resentence shall be applied in satisfaction of the revised 
sentence. 
5. For all purposes other than this section, a sentence of imprisonment 
has the same finality when it is imposed that it would have if this section were 
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deemed tentative.4 The statute empowered the sentencing court to 
resentence an offender upon petition by the Department of Correc­
tions.5 Such a petition could be filed if the department believed, as a 
result of the offender's progress toward a noncriminal way of life, 
"that the sentence of the court may have been based upon a misap­
prehension as to the history, character, or physical or mental condi­
tion of the offender, or as to the amount of time that would be 
necessary to [protect] the public from such offender."6 The court 
could dismiss the petition without a hearing, or grant the petition 
and impose any lesser sentence.? 
In State v. Hunter,S the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine de­
clared section 1255 unconstitutional because it empowered the judi­
ciary to exercise powers properly belonging to the executive, thereby 
violating the separation of powers clauses9 of the Maine Constitu­
tion.IO On March 14, 1978, Gary Hunter was convicted of fourth 
degree homicide and sentenced to eight years imprisonment. 11 
Three years later, the Department of Corrections filed a petition in 
the superior court urging that Hunter be resentenced pursuant to sec­
not in force. Nothing in this section shall alter the remedies provided by law for 
appealing a sentence, or for vacating or correcting an illegal sentence. As used 
in this section, "court" means the judge who imposed the original sentence, 
unless he is disabled or otherwise unavailable, in which case it means any judge 
exercising similar jurisdiction. 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1255 (1983). 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. 447 A.2d 797 (Me. 1982). 
9. ME. CONST. art. III, §§ I, 2; see infra text accompanying notes 35, 36. 
10. 447 A.2d at 798. 
The constitutionality of section 1255 had been previously questioned, but not de­
cided in State v. O'Brikis, 426 A.2d 893 (Me. 1981). There, the Department ofCorrec­
tions, pursuant to section 1154 (now section 1255) petitioned the superior court to 
resentence O'Brikis, who had been convicted of burglary and theft and sentenced to two 
consecutive five year terms of imprisonment. Id. at 894. The petition stated that 
O'Brikis had made significant progress toward a noncriminal way of life and that, as a 
result, "the sentencing judge may have mistakenly forcast the length of time O'Brikis 
should be confined to protect the public." Id. The lower court judge expressed concern 
that the statute, in empowering the court to reduce a sentence after execution thereof had 
commenced, might violate the separation of powers clauses of the Maine Constitution by 
authorizing the judiciary to exercise the pardoning power, given exclusively to the execu­
tive. Id. Having heard evidence on the offender's behavior and attitude while in prison, 
however, the judge determined that O'Brikis should be resentenced. Id. at 895 n.4. The 
supreme judicial court dismissed the state's appeal on procedural grounds, leaving the 
question of the statute's constitutionality undecided until Hunler. ld. at 896. 
II. 447 A.2d at 798. 
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tion 1255. 12 The petition stated that since his imprisonment, Hunter 
had made substantial progress toward a noncriminal way of life. 13 It 
further stated that the bases for this conclusion were that Hunter had 
an exemplary criminal record, that he had participated in alcohol 
counseling, and that he was a full-time student at the Bangor Theo­
logical Seminary.14 As a result of these factors, the department be­
lieved that "the sentencing judge may have misapprehended the 
amount of time necessary to protect the public from him."15 The 
department recommended that the court resentence Hunter, and 
place him on probation for the remainder of his term. 16 
The superior court dismissed the petition, holding that the stat­
ute, in empowering the court to "modify a sentence after it [had] 
been imposed on the ground of changes in the attitude or behavior 
of the offender," encroached upon the power of the executive to 
commute sentences,17 On appeal, the supreme judicial court, over a 
strong dissent, affirmed the lower court's decision,18 holding section 
1255 unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers 
clauses of the Maine Constitution. 19 
This note will examine the limitations which the Maine Consti­
tution places on the sentencing court's power to reduce a sentence 
after the offender has begun serving the sentence. The starting point 
for this discussion will be the background of section 1255, which will 
be followed by a presentation of the supreme judicial court's analysis 
in Hunter. Next, the traditional power of the executive to commute 
sentences and the inherent power of the judiciary to modify 
sentences will be analyzed in an effort to evaluate the soundness of 
the court's decision in Hunter. Finally, the effects of the Hunter de­
cision on the revisions of the criminal code and the abolition of pa­
role will be discussed. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Section 1255 was designed to supplement Rule 35 of the Maine 
Rules of Criminal Procedure,20 which allows the sentencing judge to 
12. /d. 
13. Id. at 799. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 803. 
19. /d. at 798. 
20. ME. R. CRIM. P. 35. 
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revise a sentence at any time before the offender has begun to serve 
his sentence.21 Rule 35 represents a "recognition that 'second 
thoughts' or supplementary information may arise which call for a 
change in the sentence originally imposed."22 Frequently, however, 
such supplementary information does not come to light until after 
the offender has begun serving his sentence. Therefore, the legisla­
ture believed that section 1255 was a necessary vehicle for conveying 
that information to the judge who imposed the original sentence.23 
The roots of section 1255 lie in chapter 264, section 5 of the 
Massachusetts Criminal Code.24 That statute differed from section 
1255 in a number of crucial aspects. Under the Massachusetts Code, 
the Department of Corrections was authorized for a period of one 
year after the imposition of the original sentence to petition the sen­
tencing court to reseritence an offender. 25 The statute empowered 
the department to petition "li]f, as a result of examination and classi­
fication [of the offendt;r] by the department ... the commissioner of 
correction [was] satisfied that the sentence of the court may have 
been based upon a misapprehension as to the history, character, or 
physical or mental condition of the offender."26 Section 1255 altered 
this format by removing the one year time restriction for petitioning, 
and by focusing the attention of the Department of Corrections on 
the offender's "progress toward a noncriminal way oflife."27 Section 
1255 also added an additional basis for resentencing: the depart­
ment's belief that the sentence of the court may have misappre­
hended "the amount of time that would be necessary to provide for 
protection of the public from such offender."28 
Thus, the focus of the department's decision to petition for re­
sentencing under the Massachusetts statute was on factors discov­
ered by examination or classification of the offender shortly after his 
arrival in prison.29 This indicates that the major concern of that stat­
ute was with the offender's behavior and personal attributes that 
were likely to be present at the time that the original sentence was 
imposed.30 The focus of section 1255, however, appears to be on the 
21. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. I7-A, § 1154 comment-I975 (Supp. 1982). 
22. /d. 
23. /d. 
24. Mass. Crim. Code, ch. 264, § 5 (1971). 
25. /d. 
26. /d. 
27. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1255 (1983). 
28. /d. 
29. Mass. Crim. Code, ch. 264, § 5 (1971). 
30. See id. 
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offender's progress toward a noncriminal way of life,3) indicating 
that the major concern was with the behavior of the offender after 
imposition of the original sentence.32 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Hunter Decision 
The Hunter court held that section 1255 violated the separation 
of powers clauses of the Maine Constitution because it authorized 
the judiciary to exercise a part of the executive power to commute 
sentences.33 The court noted that the separation of powers provi­
sions of the Maine Constitution were "explicit and restrictive."34 
The court stated that article III, section one divided the powers of 
government into three distinct departments,35 and that section two 
mandated that "no persons or person, belonging to one of these de­
partments, shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to 
either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or 
permitted."36 The Hunter court defined the separation of powers 
standard: "[If] the power in issue [has] been explicitly granted to one 
branch of state government, and to no other branch. . . article III, 
section 2 forbids another branch to exercise that power."37 As a re­
sult, the determinative issue became whether the power to revise 
sentences, which section 1255 granted to the courts, fell within the 
powers that the Maine Constitution granted to the judiciary, or 
whether it fell within the exclusive power of the executive to com­
mute sentences.38 
The court determined that section 1255 provided two bases for 
judicial resentencing, with the motivating factor in each being the 
31. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1255 (1983). 
32. Id. 
33. 447 A.2d at 798. 
34. Id. at 799. 
35. Id.; ME. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
36. 447 A.2d at 798; ME. CONST. art III, § 2. The result of the separation of powers 
clauses is that each branch of government is independant and co-equal, and thus 
supreme within its legitimate sphere of action. Ex parte Davis, 41 Me. 38, 53 (1856). 
Each branch is authorized to utilize those powers necessary to accomplish the objects 
which fall within its sphere of action, when not expressly allocated to, or limited by the 
existance ofa similar power in one of the other branches. Board of Overseers v. Lee, 422 
A.2d 998, 1002 (Me. 1980). The Hunter court interpreted the separation of powers 
clauses to mean that if the constitution grants a power to one branch of government, no 
other branch may exercise that power unless the constitution so permits. 447 A.2d at 800. 
37. 447 A.2d at 800. 
38. Id. 
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offender's progress toward a noncriminal way of life.39 The court 
interpreted the first basis as resting on the sentencing judge's misap­
prehension of the facts concerning the offender's history, character 
or physical or mental condition.40 The court interpreted the second 
basis, which was the primary issue in Hunter, as "contemplat[ing] 
that the judge will change the sentence because he concludes, in view 
of the offender's good behavior while serving his sentence, that he no 
longer poses a threat to society."41 
The Department of Corrections argued that the powers granted 
to the court under section 1255 fell within the realm of traditional 
judicial activity because the statute went no further than to authorize 
the sentencing court to correct a misapprehension or error concern­
ing facts which were present at the time of sentencing.42 The court, 
however, disagreed, stating that the decision as to how much time 
was necessary for protection of the public from a particular offender 
was a judgmental conclusion from facts, not an objective finding of 
fact.43 Thus, the majority reasoned, resentencing an offender on the 
basis of a misapprehension of the time necessary to protect the pub­
lic, was more than a mere correction of error concerning facts pres­
ent at the time that the original sentence was imposed.44 
The court was also troubled by the fact that the resentencing 
occurred after the offender had begun to serve his sentence.45 While 
recognizing the sentencing court's inherent power to correct a sen­
tence before the offender has begun to serve it, the court determined 
that this power ceased to exist after the sentence had been exe­
39. /d. 
40. Id. The court said that because the Department of Corrections was not seeking 
resentencing for Gary Hunter under the first basis, it would not rule on the constitution­
ality of that part of section 1255. Id. at 801 n.lO. The court stated, however, that: 
[iJn any future case of resentencing sought under that first basis, two questions 
would have to be answered affirmatively before the constitutionality issue is 
even reached: (i) Is there any authorization in section 1255(2) for resentencing 
on the first basis when the misapprehension or mistake of fact comes to light 
otherwise than "as a result of the department's evaluation of [the inmate's] pro­
gress toward a noncriminal way of life"; and (ii) even if so, is the provision for 
resentencing on the first basis severable from the provision for resentencing on 
the second basis, which we in the instant case hold violates the Maine 
Constitution? 
Id. 
41. Id. at 800. 
42. Id. at 801. 
43. Id. at 801-02. 
44. Id. at 802. 
45. Id. 
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cuted.46 This factor, coupled with the court's determination that the 
resentencing permitted by section 1255 involved more than mere 
correction of error concerning facts existing at the time of the origi­
nal imposition of sentence, led the court to conclude that the power 
granted to the sentencing court by section 1255 did not fall within 
the realm of traditional judicial activity.47 Instead, the court decided 
that this power fell within the exclusive power of the executive to 
commute sentences.48 Therefore, because section 1255 empowered 
the judicial branch to exercise this power, the court declared that it 
violated the separation of powers clauses of the Maine 
Constitution.49 
Justice Wathen authored a spirited dissent in which he asserted 
that the majority misconstrued section 1255 "to create, rather than 
avoid, [a] constitutional confrontation."50 He noted that the court 
had a duty to uphold legislative enactments if they were susceptible 
"to a reasonable interpretation which would satisfy constitutional re­
quirements."51 This, he claimed, was possible here.52 
Justice Wathen asserted that because the new code, for the first 
time, identified protection of the public as one of the goals of sen­
tencing, a new type of sentence was created, which he labeled the 
"protective sentence."53 This protective sentence, he maintained, 
46. Id. 
47. ld. at 801-03. The court stated: 
A trial judge's decision as to what sentence is necessary to protect the public 
from an offender is not a finding of fact, but a judgmental conclusion from 
facts. It is a prediction, the judge's best guess at the time, of the appropriate 
sentence in all the circumstances. Unlike the foundational or evidentiary facts 
on which the judge's conclusion rests, his sentencing decision cannot be said to 
be an objective "fact" having an existance independant of judicial proceeding. 
Correction of error in the foundational facts found at the time of sentencing is 
qualitatively different from altering the sentence years later on the basis of the 
offender's subsequent behavior. In the latter situation, "misapprehension" 
means no more than misprediction; it has little or nothing to do with the tradi­
tional concept of the correction of judicial error. 
ld. at 801-02. 
48. ld. at 802. 
49. Id. at 803. 
50. /d. (Wathen, J., dissenting). 
51. Id.; see also Portland Pipeline Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Comm'n, 
307 A.2d I, 15 (Me. 1973); State v. Phillips, 107 Me. 249, 253, 78 A. 283,284-85 (1910). 
52. 447 A.2d at 803 (Wathen, J., dissenting). 
53. Id. at 804. Justice Wathen asserted that a protective sentence is different from 
other types of sentences in that the protective sentence serves the aim of incapacitation. 
Id. 
To the extent that the intent of the sentence is purely incapacitative, "attention 
is not focused on the reduction of the offender's propensity for future criminal 
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was the basis for the court's authority to resentence under section 
1255.54 He also asserted that because the legislature authorized the 
court to resentence an offender only if the sentencing judge deter­
mined that he misapprehended the amount of time necessary to pro­
tect the public from the offender, the only sentences which would be 
subject to resentencing under section 1255 would be those which 
were protective in nature.55 Justice Wathen argued that, seen in this 
light, section 1255 did no more than permit the court to correct pre­
existing factual errors.56 This, he asserted, the majority acknowl­
edged that the legislature may authorize a court to do.57 He claimed 
that the majority over-emphasized the phrase "[i]f, as a result ofthe 
department's evaluation ofsuch person's progress toward a noncriminal 
way oflife, the department is satisfied that the sentence of the court 
may have been based upon a misapprehension, it may file a peti­
tion."58 According to his view, the court does not consider the of­
fender's progress toward a noncriminal way of life in its decision to 
resentence.59 Instead, only the Department of Corrections utilizes 
this information in its decision of whether to petition for resentenc­
acts; rather the offender is controlled so as to preclude his opportunity for such 
behavior at least while under the authority of the state." 
Id. (quoting M. GOTTFREDSON, D. GOTTFREDSON, DECISIONMAKING IN CRIMINAL Jus­
TICE 174 (1980». 
54. 447 A.2d at 804 (Wathen, J., dissenting). 
55. Id. at 805. Justice Wathen asserted that even though the Maine legislature has 
not specified the factual basis upon which a protective sentence should rest, there are 
some guidelines available for determining whether a protective sentence has been im­
posed. Id. 
The offender is one who is deemed to be incorrigible or at least unlikely to 
respond to ordinary penal measures. His sentence is longer in duration than 
would be necessary to serve the purposes of deterrence, rehabilitation or pun­
ishment. The sentencing judge. to some extent, ignores the needs of the individ­
ual defendant and measures the need of society to be protected. The resulting 
sentence is for a substantial number of years, usually in excess of five. . . . 
Id. Since the decision to impose a protective sentence is within the discretion of the 
sentencing judge, and because the judge is not required to specify his reasons for impos­
ing a sentence, only the judge who imposed the original sentence knows whether the 
sentence is protective. Id. 
56. Id. at 805-06. Justice Wathen agreed with the majority in saying that the deci­
sion to impose a protective sentence "is not in itself a finding of fact, but rather a judg­
mental conclusion based upon facts." Id. at 806. He asserted, however, that the 
misapprehension at which section 1255 is aimed lies in the foundational facts upon which 
the protective sentence is based. Id. Thus, if the judge misapprehended these facts. the 
sentence imposed was, in effect, erroneous and should be open to correction, even if the 
offender has begun to serve it. See id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 805-06 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1255(2) (1983» (em­
phasis added). 
59. Id. at 806. 
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ing.60 The judge, he asserted, only reconsiders those factors which 
led him to impose the protective sentence in the first instance.61 
Thus, Justice Wathen concluded, because section 1255 only author­
ized the court to exercise those powers that were within the bounda­
ries of traditional judicial activity, it was not unconstitutiona1.62 
In order to properly examine the propriety of the court's deci­
sion in Hunter, it is necessary to examine both the traditional power 
of the executive to commute sentences, and the inherent power of the 
trial court over executed sentences. Having done this, it will be pos­
sible to determine the propriety of the time limits placed upon the 
court's ability to modify sentences. In addition, it will be possible to 
examine legitimacy of limiting the sentence-modification decision to 
a consideration of facts which existed at the time that the original 
sentence was imposed. 
B. The Traditional Powers oj'the Executive to Commute Sentences 
A pardon is an act of grace which releases the offender from the 
consequences of his offense.63 It erases the offender's guilt, leaving 
him innocent in the eyes of the law.64 The grant of the pardoning 
power to the chief executive is exclusive of all other branches of gov­
ernment.65 Thus, "the Legislature cannot, directly or indirectly, take 
it from his control, and vest it in others, or authorize or require it to 
be exercised by any other officer or authority."66 
The commutation of a sentence is the substitution of a lesser 
punishment for a greater punishment.67 It is a "part of the pardon­
ing power, and may be exercised under a general grant of that 
power."68 A commutation leaves the judgment of guilt intact, while 
changing the sentence imposed by law.69 After a commutation has 
been granted, the commuted sentence is the only one in existence, 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. See id. at 805-06. 
63. Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877). 
64. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866). 
65. State v. Dalton, 109 Tenn. 544, 547, 72 S.W. 456, 457 (1903). 
66. Id. 
67. Eg., Hunter, 447 A.2d at 802; Commonwealth v. Arsenault, 361 Mass. 287, 
291-92, 280 N.E.2d 129, 132 (1972); Murphy v. Wolfer, 127 Minn. 102, 103, 148 N.W. 
896,897 (1914); Ex parte Giles, 502 S.W.2d 774, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). 
68. Eg., Chapman v. Scott, 10 F.2d 156, 159 (D. Conn. 1925). 
69. Hunter, 447 A.2d at 802; Commonwealth v. Arsenault, 361 Mass. 287, 292, 280 
N.E.2d 129, 132 (1972) (quoting Rittenberg v. Smith, 214 Mass. 343,347,101 N.E. 989, 
990 (1913). In this respect a commutation is extremely similar to the judicial resentenc­
ing provided for by section 1255. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1255 (1983). 
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and the only one considered.70 
Generally, the power to commute sentences is viewed as "a sov­
ereign power inherent in the state."7) Thus, the executive may exer­
cise it "for whatever reason he deems appropriate and it is not for 
the courts to inquire into the rationale of his decision."72 Most juris­
dictions, including Maine, hold that the commutation power is ex­
clusively vested in the Governor, and may not be interfered with, or 
exercised by either of the other branches of government.73 Accord­
ingly, the legislature cannot delegate to the judiciary the power to 
commute sentences, as this would usurp the power of the executive 
and would be in direct violation of the separation of powers 
clauses.14 
The power to resentence an offender after execution of the sen­
tence has commenced, which was the subject of section 1255, is simi­
lar to the executive's power to commute sentences. Both leave the 
judgment of guilt intact while changing the sentence originally im­
posed.75 Neither power has a time limit placed upon when it may be 
exercised.76 Essentially, the only difference between the two is that, 
under section 1255, before the sentencing judge can resentence an 
offender, he must first find that the judge who imposed the original 
sentence misapprehended either the history, character or physical or 
mental condition of the offender, or the amount of time necessary to 
protect the public from the offender.77 With the exercise of an exec­
utive pardon, however, the executive may commute a sentence for 
70. Murphy v. Wolfer, 127 Minn. 102,103, 148 N.W. 896, 897 (1914). A commuta­
tion, in effect, eliminates the sentence originally imposed, leaving the commuted sentence 
the only one considered by law. Id. 
71. Whittington v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 604, 73 So. 2d 137, 139-40 (1954). 
72. Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1225 (D.D.C. 1974). 
73. E.g., Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 29 (1916); Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. 
Supp. 1221, 1226 (D.D.C. 1974); Singleton v. State, 38 Fla. 297, 301, 21 So. 21, 22 (1896); 
Neal v. State, 104 Ga. 509, 511, 30 S.E. 858,858-59 (1898); Doyon v. State, 158 Me. 190, 
198-99, 181 A.2d 586, 590, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 849 (1962); Whittington v. Stevens, 221 
Miss. 598,604,73 So. 2d 137, 140 (1954); Territory v. Richardson, 9 Okla. 579, 584-85, 60 
P.2d 244, 246 (1900); State v. Dalton, 109 Tenn. 544, 547, 72 S.W. 456,457 (1903); Ex 
parte Giles, 502 S.W.2d 774, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). Contra Ware v. Sanders, 146 
Iowa 233, 246, 124 N.W. 1081, 1086 (1910); Whittington v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 607, 
73 So. 2d 137, 141 (1954) (Ethridge, J., dissenting). 
74. Ex parte Giles, 502 S.W.2d 774, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). 
75. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1255 (1983); see supra note 69 and ac­
companying text. 
76. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1255 (1983); Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 
1221, 1226 (D.D.C. 1974). 
77. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1255 (1983). 
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whatever reason he deems appropriate.78 
It is necessary, however, to examine the inherent powers of the 
sentencing court in order to determine whether the power to resen­
tence an offender79 after he has commenced service of his original 
sentence, and the power to consider the offender's post-sentencing 
behavior in the resentencing decision, fall within the realm of tradi­
tional judicial activity,80 or whether section 1255 represents an im­
proper delegation of the executive's power to commute sentences. 
C. The Inherent Powers of the Sentencing Court 
Most constitutions do not grant many explicit substantive pow­
ers to the judiciary. 81 Exactly which powers are inherent to the judi­
cial branch are open to considerable controversy, as the guidelines 
for pinpointing them are ambiguous. It is commonly said that "[t]he 
inherent powers of a court are such as result from the very nature of 
its organization, and are essential to its existence and protection, and 
to the due administration of justice."82 Thus, a discussion of those 
powers which have been recognized as inherent to the courts is nec­
essary in order to determine whether the powers granted to the 
courts under section 1255 were inherent to the judiciary. 
There is much disagreement over what inherent powers the sen­
tencing courts possess in the area of sentence modification.83 The 
overwhelming weight of authority holds that the sentencing court 
has the inherent power to modify a sentence it has imposed for some 
period of time after imposition.84 The original revision period ap­
78. Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221, 1225 (D.D.C. 1974). 
79. For the purposes of this discussion, the power to resentence an offender, which 
is the subject of section 1255, will be considered synonymous to the power to modify a 
sentence. In substance, any difference between the two terms is negligible. 
80. If the power to resentence an offender is an inherent judicial power, section 
1255 would not violate the separation of powers clauses because article VI, section I of 
the Maine Constitution explicitly vests the judicial branch with the judicial power, ME. 
CONST. art. VI, § I, and article I, section 2 states that no person belonging to one depart­
ment "shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except 
in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted" Id. art. I, § 2 (emphasis added). 
81. E.g., ARK. CONST. art. VII, §§ I-II; COLO CONST. art. VI, §§ 1-25; CONN. 
CONST. art. V, §§ 1-7; ME. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1-6; N.H. CONST. Pt. 2, art. 73-81; N.J. 
CONST. art. VI, §§ 1-7; WIS. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1-24. 
Typically, constitutions merely establish that "[t)he judicial power of this state shall 
be vested in a Supreme Judicial Court, and such other courts as the Legislature shall 
from time to time establish." ME. CONST. art. VI, § I. Exactly what powers are encom­
passed by this vague grant of judicial power is ambiguous. 
82. E.g., Fuller v. State, 100 Miss. 811, 817, 57 So. 806, 807 (1912). 
83. See infra notes 85-118 and accompanying text. 
84. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931) (court may decrease a sentence 
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pears to have been the duration of the term of court85 at which the 
original sentence was imposed, provided the offender had not yet 
begun to service the sentence.86 The major reason for allowing this 
revision period is that the sentence "remains in the breast of the 
court"87 during the term of court at which it was imposed, and thus 
remains modifiable until the term of court expires, or until the of­
fender begins to serve the sentence.88 
Another reason for allowing this revision period is the view that 
the power to reduce a sentence exists as an incident to the adminis­
tration of criminal justice,89 whereby the goals are to protect the 
public as well as to aid the offender in returning to society as a law­
abiding citizen.90 This view was adhered to by the United States 
Supreme Court in United States v. Benz .91 There, the Court held 
that the sentencing court had the inherent power to modify a sen­
as long as the term of the court has not expired); Thomas v. State, 566 P.2d 630, 636-38 
(Alaska 1977) (court may reduce a sentence for up to 60 days after original sentence 
imposed); People v. Smith, 189 Colo. 50, 51, 536 P.2d 820, 822 (1975) (court may alter 
sentence for up to 120 days after imposition of original sentence); State v. Pallotti, 119 
Conn. 70, 74,174 A. 74, 76 (1934) (court may modify a sentence during term of court as 
long as the offender has not yet begun to serve it); Brown v. Rice, 57 Me. 55, 57 (1869) 
(court may modify a sentence as long as the term of court has not expired and the sen­
tence has not been executed); Commonwealth v. Weymouth, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 144, 147 
(1861) (sentence subject to alteration as long as it remains unexecuted); State v. Thom­
son, 110 N.H. 190, 191,263 A.2d 675, 676 (1970) (court may modify a sentence as long as 
the offender has not begun to serve it); State v. White, 71 N.M. 342, 346, 378 P.2d 379, 
381 (1963) (court may modify a sentence as long as the term of court has not expired); In 
re Cedar, 240 A.D. 182, 186, 269 N.Y.S. 733, 737 (1934) (court may modify sentence 
during term of court at which originally imposed as long as offender has not begun to 
serve it); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 106, 175 N.W.2d 625, 628 (1970) (trial court may 
alter a sentence within 120 days of date original sentence imposed). 
The discussion here is limited to modification of legal sentences whereby the.origi­
nal sentence is reduced. An increase in sentence after the offender has begun to serve it 
raises the additional problem of double jeopardy. For a discussion of this issue, see Ex 
parle Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). 
85. "Term of court" refers to the "time prescribed by law during which a court 
holds session." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1318 (5th ed. 1979). 
86. Eg., United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 358 (1928); Tuttle v. Lang, 100 
Me. 123, 125,60 A. 892, 893 (1905); District Attorney v. Superior Court, 342 Mass. 119, 
122, 172 N.E.2d 245, 247 (1961) (dicta); In re Cedar, 240 A.D. 182, 186,269 N.Y.S. 733, 
737 (1934). 
87. As applied here, the phrase "breast of court" means that the sentence remains 
in the "conscience, discretion, or recollection of the judge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
172 (5th ed. 1979). 
88. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304,306-07 (1931); State v. Dalton, 109 Tenn. 
544,546-47, 72 S.W. 456, 457 (1903). 
89. State v. Thomson, 110 N.H. 190, 191-92, 263 A.2d 675, 677 (1970). 
90. State v. Lemire, 116 N.H. 395, 397, 359 A.2d 644, 646 (1976). 
91. 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931). 
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tence during the term of court at which the original sentence was 
imposed because "[t]o reduce a sentence by amendment alters the 
terms of the judgment itself and is a judicial act as much as the im­
position of the sentence in the first instance."92 
The primary reason espoused for adding the restriction that the 
power to modify a sentence ceases to exist once the offender begins 
to serve the sentence, is that to modify a sentence after execution has 
commenced is a commutation of sentence, a power exclusively 
vested in the executive branch of govemment.93 It is asserted, there­
fore, that an exercise of this power by the judiciary is an unconstitu­
tional infringement upon the executive's power.94 This view is based 
upon the belief that once the offender begins to serve his sentence, he 
is in the custody of the executive branch, which in tum assumes 
complete control over the sentence imposed by the judicial branch.95 
Accordingly, at that point in time, the judiciary loses jurisdiction 
over both the case and the offender, and is powerless to alter the 
sentence.96 
Maine and a number of other jurisdictions have discarded the 
term of court time restriction97 and have ruled that the sentencing 
court has the power to modify a sentence until the offender begins to 
serve, regardless of whether the term of the court has expired.98 This 
view is the result of the decrease in the importance of the term of 
court in dictating the court's power to act.99 These jurisdiction~ hold 
92. Id. at 311. The Benz court further held that the sentencing court's power to 
modify a sentence exists throughout the term of the court regardless of whether the of­
fender has commenced service of the sentence. Id.; see infra notes 104- \07 and accompa­
nying text. 
93. McClm'e v. District Court, 187 Colo. 359, 361, 532 P.2d 340, 341-42 (1975); 
People v. Herrera, 183 Colo. 155, 160-63,516 P.2d 626, 627-28 (1973); State v. Hunter, 
447 A.2d 797,803 (Me. 1982); People v. Fox, 312 Mich. 577,581-82,20 N.W.2d 732, 733 
(1945); State v. Dunn, III N.H. 320, 322, 282 A.2d 675, 677 (1971); State v. White, 71 
N.M. 342,344-45,378 P.2d 379, 381 (1963) (dicta). 
94. See cases cited supra note 93. 
95. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12, 20, 140 N.E. 470, 474 
(1923). 
96. Tuttle v. Lang, 100 Me. 123, 126,60 A. 892, 894 (1905). 
97. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text. 
98. E.g., State v. Gove, 379 A.2d 152, 154 (Me. 1977); State v. Thomson, I \0 N.H. 
190, 191,263 A.2d 675,676 (1970); State v. Harbaugh, 132 Vt. 569, 579-80, 326 A.2d 821 
827-28 (1974); ME. R. CRIM. P. 35(a); see McClure v. District Court, 187 Colo. 359, 361, 
532 P.2d 340, 342 (1975); In re Lankow, 134 Vt. 12, 13, 346 A.2d 216, 217 (1975). 
99. See ME. R. CRIM. P. 35(a), § 35.1. The earlier rule was that the expiration of 
the term of court ended the power of the court to act in a criminal case. Id. Thus, it was 
held that the sentencing court "had jurisdiction over its judgments during the term at 
which it was imposed, except when execution of the sentence had begun." Id.; see State 
v. Blanchard, 156 Me. 30, 52,159 A.2d 304,316 (1960). At present, however, the expira­
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that the court's power to modify a sentence ceases to exist once the 
offender begins to serve the sentence. loo This view is partially juris­
dictional in nature with the rule being that once the offender begins 
to serve the sentence the executive branch assumes jurisdiction over 
his case. 101 Accordingly, a modification of the sentence, after service 
has commenced, is an executive function. 102 This rule is also based 
on constitutional notions, in that because the constitution vests the 
power to alter a sentence after it has been imposed in the executive 
branch, the separation of powers principle prohibits either of the 
other branches from exercising or interfering with that power. \03 
Other jurisdictions have chosen to retain the term of court re­
striction for judicial modification of sentence, and have ruled that 
the court may resentence an offender at any time within the term of 
the court regardless of whether the offender has begun to serve the 
sentence. 104 These jurisdictions reason that judicial modification of 
sentence after execution has commenced is not a usurpation of the 
pardoning power of the executive because the respective powers of 
each branch are distinguishable. \05 The United States Supreme 
Court, in Benz, reasoned that: 
To render a judgment is a judicial function. To carry the judg­
ment into effect is an executive function. To cut short a sentence 
by an act of clemency is an exercise of the executive power which 
abridges the enforcement of the judgment, but does not alter it [in 
its character as a] judgment. To reduce a sentence by amendment 
alters the terms of the judgment itself and is a judicial act as much 
as the imposition of the sentence in the first instance. \06 
Those jurisdictions which have followed the Benz rationale have in­
terpreted it as laying the separation of powers contention to rest in 
tion of the term of court does not effect the power of the court to act in a criminal pro­
ceeding. See ME. R. CRIM. P. 45(c); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (1980). 
Therefore, that part of the limitation on the court's power to revise a sentence no longer 
applies and the court may modify a sentence until the offender begins to serve it. ME. R. 
CRIM. P. 35(a), § 35.1; State v. Gove, 379 A.2d 152, 154 (Me. 1977). 
100. See supra note 98. 
101. Tuttle v. Lang, 100 Me. 123, 125, 60 A. 892, 893 (1905); Commonwealth v. 
Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12,20, 140 N.E. 470, 474 (1923). 
102. Doyon v. State, 158 Me. 190, 198-99, 181 A.2d 586, 590, em. denied, 371 U.S. 
849 (1962); State v. Sturgis, 110 Me. 96, 100-01 (1912); Tuttle v. Lang, 100 Me. 123, 125, 
60 A. 892, 894 (1905); Brown v. Rice, 57 Me. 55, 57 (1869). 
103. See cases cited supra note 102. 
104. Benz, 282 U.S. at 307; District Attorney v. Superior Court, 342 Mass. 119, 128, 
172 N.E.2d 245,251 (1961); State v. White, 71 N.M. 342, 346, 378 P.2d 379, 381 (1962). 
105. E.g., 282 U.S. at 311. 
106. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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situations in which the judicial modification of sentence occurs dur­
ing the term of the court, even though the offender has begun to 
serve the sentence. 107 . 
Still other jurisdictions have discarded both the term of court 
and the "before execution" restrictions. 108 These jurisdictions have 
instituted time restrictions wholly unrelated to the term of the court 
and the beginning of execution. 109 In these states, the court is per­
mitted to resentence an offender for a stated period of time, usually 
ranging from sixty days to one year from the date of imposition. I 10 
These rules are sustained by the view that for a certain period of 
time the sentence remains under the control of the court, and there­
fore may be modified. II I It is held, in these jurisdictions, that the 
finality of the judgment and the sentence of the court is suspended 
during this period. I 12 Accordingly, during this interval, the sentence 
107. District Attorney v. Superior Court, 342 Mass. 119, 127, 172 N.E.2d 245, 250 
(1961); State v. White, 71 N.M. 342, 345, 378 P.2d 379, 381 (1962). 
It could be argued that the Supreme Court's holding in Benz should be read in light 
of the less restrictive federal separation of powers principle. Indeed, the Federal Consti­
tution has no explicit separation of powers clause. Hunter, 447 A.2d at 799; see U.S. 
CONST. Instead, the separation of powers principle is inferred from the constitution. 
Buckley v. Valoe, 424 U.S. I, 120 (1976); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926); 
Hunter, 447 A.2d at 799. Therefore, the federal separation of powers principle is less 
restrictive than that mandated by the Maine Constitution and "by no means contem­
plates total separation of each of [the) three essential branches of Government." Buck­
ley, 424 U.S. at 121. From this it could be argued that the rationale espoused by the 
Benz court for allowing judicial modification of sentence after the offender has begun to 
serve the sentence is inapplicable to cases arising in states, like Maine, which have strict 
separation of powers standards. This argument is not persuasive, however, because the 
Benz court explicitly held that a reduction of sentence during the term of court at which 
the original sentence was imposed is a judicial function. 282 U.S. at 311. Therefore, the 
strictness of the separation of powers clause appears to be irrelevant to this issue. 
108. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 566 P.2d 630, 638 (Alaska 1977); People v. Smith, 
189 Colo. 50, 51-52, 536 P.2d 820, 822 (1975); State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 109, 119-27, 
445 A.2d 304, 308-13 (1982); State v. Arambula, 97 Idaho 627, 631, 550 P.2d 130, 134 
(1976); State v. Tumminello, 70 N.J. 187, 191,358 A.2d 769, 771 (1976); Hayes v. State, 
46 Wis. 2d 93, 102-07, 175 N.W.2d 625, 628-32 (1970). 
109. Eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 5-195, -196 (1983) (Sentence Review Division 
may resentence an offender within 30 days of original sentence); N.J. REV. STAT. § 30:21­
10 (1982) (court may reduce sentence upon motion by the offender made within 60 days 
after date of original judgment, or at any time upon motion by both the offender and the 
prosecuting attorney showing good cause); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35(a) (court may reduce 
sentence within 60 days after it was imposed or within 60 days after final appeal of con­
viction); COLO R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (court may resentence offender within 120 days after 
original sentence imposed); IDAHO CRIM. R. 35 (same). 
110. See supra notes 108-109. 
Ill. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 566 P.2d 630, 637-38 (Alaska 1977); People v. 
Smith, 189 Colo. 50, 51-52, 536 P.2d 820, 822 (1975). 
112. People v. Smith, 189 Colo. 50, 51-52, 536 P.2d 820, 822 (1975). 
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remains in the contemplation of the law and may be modified by the 
court.1\3 Jurisdictions adhering to this view dispose of the separa­
tion of powers argument by relying on the Benz rationale. 114 
A survey of the applicable case law indicates that the sentencing 
court does possess the inherent power to modify a sentence for some 
period of time after imposition. I IS There is much disagreement, 
however, over what factors the sentencing court may consider in 
making the decision of whether to modify a sentence. Maine's posi­
tion appears to be that the court may only consider those factors that 
existed at the time the original sentence was imposed and either 
played a part, or if had been known, would have played a part, in 
the original sentencing decision. 116 This position is based on the 
view that "the power to reduce an offender's sentence on the basis of 
his post-conviction behavior is not part of the traditional judicial 
power [to modify a sentence]; rather, it is encompassed within the 
executive's commutation power."117 Thus, the court may not con­
sider the extent to which the offender may have been rehabilitated 
since his confinement in prison. 118 
The position of the Maine courts finds support in other jurisdic­
tions. In the New Hampshire case of State v. Dunn, 119 the offender, 
having served almost four years of a seven to fifteen year sentence, 
filed a motion for reduction of his sentence. 120 The superior court 
judge, believing that he did not have authority to reduce the sen­
tence, denied the motion. I2I On appeal, the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire affirmed the lower court's decision, and held that the 
trial court had no authority to revise a sentence after the term of 
court had expired or after the offender had begun to serve the sen­
113. 282 u.s. at 307-08; Thomas v. State, 566 P.2d 630, 637 (Alaska 1977). Mr. 
Justice Sutherland, for the majority in Benz, wrote: 
The general rule is that judgments, decrees and orders are within the con­
trol of the court during the term at which they were made. They are then 
deemed to be "in the breast of the court" making them, and subject to be 
amended, modified, or vacated by that court. . . . The rule is not confined to 
civil cases, but applies in criminal cases as well, provided the punishment be not 
augmented. 
282 U.S. at 306-07 (citations omitted). 
114. Thomas v. State, 566 P.2d 630, 637 (Alaska 1977); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 
93, 10 1-02, 175 N. W .2d 625, 629 (1970); see supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text. 
115. See supra notes 84-114 and accompanying text. 
116. See Hunter, 447 A.2d at 802-03. 
117. Id. at 803. 
118. Id. 
119. III N.H. 320, 282 A.2d 675 (1971). 
120. Id. at 320, 282 A.2d at 676. 
121. Id. 
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tence. 122 The court emphasized the fact that the motion for reduc­
tion that the offender sought, was based, not on factors which existed 
at the time the original sentence was imposed, but upon events that 
took place after the sentence was imposed, while the offender was 
serving his sentence. 123 These matters, the court ruled, were within 
the realm of executive power, and not that of the judiciary. 124 
A few jurisdictions have held that the sentencing court may con­
sider whether, and to what extent, an offender has rehabilitated him­
self since the original sentence was imposed. 125 This view appears to 
be based upon an extension of the rationale that for a stated period 
after imposition, the sentence remains in the breast of the court and 
may be modified for whatever reason the court determines is in the 
interests of justice. 126 
IV. CRITIQUE 
Having discussed the applicable case law in the area of sentence 
modification, it is now possible to examine the propriety of Hunter 
decision. The court ruled that the power to resentence an offender 
based upon post-conviction behavior, after he has begun to serve his 
original sentence was not a power inherent in the judicial branch. 127 
Instead, the court viewed the power as being essentially the power to 
commute sentences, which article V, section two of the Maine Con­
stitution grants to the executive branch of govemment. 128 Thus, the 
court held that section 1255 violated the separation of powers clauses 
of the Maine Constitution. 129 
The Hunter court's decision was primarily based on the view 
that the sentencing court's power to modify, or resentence an of­
fender, ceased to exist once the offender began to serve his sen­
tence. 130 This view is well supported by Maine case law. 131 Maine 
122. Id. at 321-22, 282 A.2d at 676-77. 
123. Id. at 322, 282 A.2d at 677. 
124. Id.; see a/so People v. Fox, 312 Mich. 577, 581-82, 20 N.W.2d 732, 733 (1945); 
State v. Harbaugh, 132 Vt. 569, 579-80, 326 A.2d 821, 827-28 (1974). 
125. United States v. McIlwain, 427 F. Supp. 358, 358-59 (D.D.C. 1977); Davis v. 
State, 566 P.2d 640, 643 (Alaska 1977). 
126. See United States v. McIlwain, 427 F. Supp. 358, 358-59 (D.D.C. 1977); 
Thomas v. State, 566 P.2d 630, 638-39 (Alaska 1977). 
127. 447 A.2d at 802-03. 
128. Id. at 803. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 802. 
13!. State v. Blanchard, 156 Me. 30, 52-54, 159 A.2d 304, 316 (1960); Brown v. 
Rice, 57 Me. 55, 57 (1869); see State v. Gove, 379 A.2d 152, 154 (Me. 1977); ME. R. 
CRIM. P. 35(a); see a/so Doyon v. State, 158 Me. 190, 198-99, 181 A.2d 586, 590, cerl. 
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courts have consistently held that the sentencing court has no power 
to modify a sentence once service of that sentence commenced. 132 It 
is reasoned that as soon as the offender begins to serve his sentence 
he is under the control of the executive branch, which in tum as­
sumes complete jurisdiction over the case at that point. 133 This view 
also serves to provide a clear line between the powers of the execu­
tive and judicial branches in the area of post-conviction relief, and 
provides for a definite end to the sentencing process. 
Even if Maine courts were to adhere to the view held by other 
jurisdictions, that the beginning of service of sentence does not end 
the court's power to alter the sentence, there would still be substan­
tial doubt as to the constitutionality of section 1255. Section 1255 
authorizes the sentencing court to resentence an offender at any time 
if the court determines that, based on the offender's progress toward 
a noncriminal way of life, the sentencing judge misapprehended the 
amount of time necessary to protect the public from the offender. 134 
Even those jurisdictions that allow the court to alter a sentence after 
the offender has begun to serve it, hold that the power to modify a 
sentence ceases to exist at some point in time. 135 Usually the power 
exists only for thirty to sixty days after the imposition of the original 
sentence or until the term of court expires. 136 Thus, it is clear that 
the sentencing court does not possess the inherent power to resen­
tence an offender years after the offender has begun to serve the sen­
tence. The rationale for this rule is sound. The sentencing court 
should not retain perpetual jurisdiction over the sentences which it 
imposes. At some point there must be an end to the sentencing pro­
cess. The most logical time for curtailing the sentencing court's ju­
risdiction is when the offender begins to serve the sentence. It is at 
this moment that the executive assumes physical control over the of­
fender and it is at this time that the judiciary's role in the matter 
should be completed. 
Another factor which casts doubt upon the constitutionality of 
section 1255, is that it allows the court to consider the offender's post 
conviction behavior in making a resentencing decision. 137 Most ju­
denied, 371 U.S. 849 (1962); State v. Sturgis, 110 Me. 96, 100-01,85 A. 474, 476-77 
(1912); Tuttle v. Lang, 100 Me. 123, 125, 60 A. 892, 893 (1905). 
132. See cases cited supra note 131. 
133. See Tuttle v. Lang, 100 Me. 123, 125, 60 A. 892, 893 (1905). 
134. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1255 (1983). 
135. See supra notes 84-114 and accompanying text. 
136. Id. 
137. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1255 (1983). 
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risdictions hold that the power to reduce a sentence on the basis of 
the offender's post-conviction behavior is not traditionally a judicial 
function.138 Instead, it is deemed a power held by the executive. 139 
The executive is charged with carrying out, or executing punish­
ment; 140 therefore, anything that occurs after the offender is impris­
oned should be within the exclusive control of the executive branch. 
"The sentencing court is not a parole board" 141 and should not con­
cern itself with matters that are not truly judicial, such as the extent 
to which an offender has been rehabilitated since his incarcera­
tion,142 or whether, on the basis of this rehabilitative progress, the 
offender deserves to be released from the remainder of his prison 
term. Decisions such as these should be left to the executive branch 
in the form of the power to pardon or par~le an offender. The exec­
utive branch, through the Department of Corrections, is better able 
to decide such matters because it deals with each offender exten­
sively and more readily can determine whether a particular offender 
has been rehabilitated to such a degree that he no longer poses a 
threat to society. 
Judge Wathen asserted that section 1255 did not violate the sep­
aration of powers clauses because it did no more than permit the 
court to correct factual errors that existed at the time the original 
sentence was imposed. 143 The foundation for this assertion is his be­
lief that the revised criminal code created a new type of sentence, 
which he labeled the "protective" sentence. l44 He asserted that the 
only sentences that could be modified pursuant to section 1255 were 
those that were protective. 145 This view, while theoretically plausi­
ble, would be extremely difficult to implement. Judge Wathen him­
self admitted that it would be extremely difficult to determine which 
sentences were protective because there is no statutory definition of a 
protective sentence and there is limited case law regarding protective 
sentences. 146 In addition it seems likely that, had the legislature in­
tended section 1255 to apply only to those sentences that were pro­
tective in nature, it would have so specified. 
The immediate effects of the court's decision in Hunter are 
138. See supra notes 116-124 and accompanying text. 
139. !d. 
140. People v. Capo, 393 Ill. 342, 345, 65 N.E.2d 777, 778 (1946). 
141. State v. Harbaugh, 132 Vt. 569, 580, 326 A.2d 821, 828 (1974). 
142. See id. at 579-80, 326 A.2d at 827-28. 
143. 447 A.2d at 805-06 (Wathen, J., dissenting). 
144. Id. at 804. 
145. Id. at 805. 
146. Id. at 804-05. 
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likely to be negligible. Since section 1255 became effective in 1976, 
only one offender has successfully been resentenced under its provi­
sions. 147 Therefore, at first glance, it does not appear that this statute 
has, up until this point in time,148 played an essential part in the 
operation of the revised criminal code. It is possible, however, that 
section 1255 may have been intended to fulfill the function of pro­
viding a "safety-value" in the system, so that any repercussions from 
the abolition of parole, such as prison overcrowding and prisoner 
unrest, could be easily remedied. With the court's decision in 
Hunter, this safety-value is no longer available. The long term effect 
of this decision could be that the prison system will become over­
crowded, causing the costs of the system to rise and causing unrest 
within the prison community. Unless the executive can find the time 
and the methods to fill this gap, the legislature will be left with the 
choice of either building more prisons, or reinstating parole. 
Section 1255 and the court's decision in Hunter will be a useful 
guideline to jurisdictions attempting to replace traditional forms of 
parole with innovative alternatives. If nothing more, they will make 
legislatures aware of the problem of encroaching upon the powers of 
another branch of government while creating these alternatives. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In State v. Hunter, 149 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held 
that section 1255 of the Maine Revised Statutes Annotated violated 
the separation of powers clauses of the Maine Constitution. ISO Sec­
tion 1255 authorized the sentencing court to resentence offenders if, 
as a result of the offender's progress toward a noncriminal way of 
life, the court was satisfied that the sentencing judge misappre­
hended the history, character or physical or mental condition of the 
offender, or misapprehended the amount of time necessary to protect 
the public from the offender. l5l In Hunter, the court ruled that the 
power to resentence an offender after he has begun to serve the sen­
147. See State v. Q'Brikis, 426 A.2d 893 (Me. 1981). 
148. It is possible that the need for section 1255's resentencing provisions has not 
yet materialized because the adverse effects of the abolition of parole (overcrowding of 
prisons and prisoner unrest) have not reached severe proportions in the seven years since 
the system has been operating without parole. As time progresses, however, and the 
number of people in prison who were sentenced before parole was abolished and are 
eligible for parole decreases, these effects may become more pronounced, thereby creat­
ing a greater need for a mechanism of releasing prisoners, such as section 1255. 
149. 447 A.2d 797 (Me. 1982). 
150. Id. at 798. 
151. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1255 (1983). 
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tence originally imposed was not a power inherent in the judiciary, 
but rather was a power belonging exclusively to the executive. 152 
Therefore, the court held that section 1255 was unconstitutional. 153 
A survey of the relevant case law indicates that the sentencing 
court does have an inherent power to modify a sentence for some 
period of time after imposition. While jurisdictions have disagreed 
over the duration of this period, they have agreed that it must be 
limited. 154 The reason for this limitation is that, at some point in 
time, the executive branch of government assumes complete control 
over the offender and the execution of his sentence. Thus, for the 
judiciary to interfere with or usurp any of this control is violative of 
the separation of powers principle. 
Many jurisdictions also have agreed that the sentencing court 
may not consider the offender's post-conviction behavior in making 
the decision to modify a sentence. 155 This rule is based upon the 
view that consideration of such factors is not within the realm of 
traditional judicial activity, but is instead encompassed by the par­
doning power of the executive. 156 Therefore, the separation of pow­
ers doctrine mandates that the judicial branch refrain from 
consideration of these factors. 
The foregoing analysis indicates that the Hunter decision was a 
sound one. While in the long run this decision could cause substan­
tial problems, they may be easily remedied by the reinstatement of 
the traditional parole system or some other constitutionally permissi­
ble substitute for parole. Whether a system of imprisonment can 
function efficiently without parole remains to be seen. As was stated 
by the chairman of the United States Parole Board: 
To those who say 'let's abolish parole,' I say that as long as we use 
imprisonment in this country, we will have to have someone, 
somewhere with the authority to release people from imprison­
ment. Call it parole---<:all it what you will. It is one of those jobs 
that has to be done. 157 
Barring any action by the legislature, or the executive, the result of 
the court's decision in Hunter is that Maine will have first-hand op­
portunity to determine whether a system of imprisonment can in fact 
152. 447 A.2d at 803. 
153. Id. 
154. See supra notes 84-114 and accompanying text. 
155. See supra notes 115-126 and accompanying text. 
156. IJunn, III N.H. at 322, 282 A.2d at 677. 
157. M. Zarr, Sentencing, 28 ME. L. REV. 117, 147 (1976) (quoting Sigler, Abolish 
Parole?, 39 FEDERAL PROBATION 42, 48 (1975». 
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function without a mechanism for releasing people from 
imprisonment. 
Darlene E. Gerry 
